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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. The Issue of Whether the Court Erred by Failing to Sua Sponte Order a
Psychological Evaluation is Properly Before the Court

The state argues that the invited error doctrine bars review of the claim. It contends that
defense counsel's negative answer to the court's question whether "either party contend[s] there
should be additional investigation or evaluation of the defendant before sentencing" estops Ms.
Bolan from contending otherwise now. State's Brief, pg. 5, quoting T pg. 14, In. 5 - pg. 16, In. 9.
As authority for its contention it cites to State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106, 114,266 P.3d 1211,
1219 (Ct. App. 2011). Rollins, however, is easily distinguishable and does not support the state's
contention.
In Rollins:

The district court inquired about the need for an LC.§ 19-2524(1) evaluation
which includes "substance abuse assessment and/or mental health examination."
Rollins' counsel stated that such an evaluation was not necessary, indicating that
the drug rehabilitation program would provide the necessary evaluation. Any error
by the district court was, thus, invited by Rollins affirmatively declining an
evaluation which could have included a mental health examination. The doctrine
of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her
own conduct induces the commission of the error. One may not complain of
errors one has consented to or acquiesced in. In short, invited errors are not
reversible.
152 Idaho at 114 n. 4,266 P.3d at 1219 n. 4 (internal citations omitted). In Rollins defense
counsel affirmatively told the sentencing court that an evaluation "was not necessary" believing
there would be an adequate substitute produced at a later time. Here trial counsel simply didn't
ask for an evaluation. He did not affirmatively ask the Court to commit eITor, rather he merely
failed to object to error. That is not sufficient to constitute invited eITor. Compare, State v.
Caudill, I 09 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985) ("In the instant case the prosecution did

not introduce the extrajudicial statement or elicit the testimony to which Caudill now objects,
rather Caudill's own counsel elicited the testimony."); compare also State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho
836, 838, 673 P .2d 436, 43 8 (1983) ("In the present case, the State having requested the trial
court to dismiss the charge has invited the very error of which it now complains.") and State v.
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816,821,864 P.2d 654,659 (Ct. App. 1993). (Where, "witness gave an

accurate, fair and responsive answer to defense counsel's question ... [d]efense counsel's failure
to know the answer to the question ... does not excuse the invited nature of the error.").
This case is more like State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 117 (1999). There, trial
counsel concurred in the court's jury instructions, but challenged some of them on appeal. The
state argued that the jury instruction error was invited by the counsel's concurrence. The
Supreme Court disagreed, noting that counsel did not invite the court to give the challenged
instructions. It wrote, "The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused
or played an important role in prompting a trial court to give or not give an instruction from later
challenging that decision on appeal." 133 Idaho at 246, 985 P.2d at 120. Here, counsel's failure
to inform the court that he thought a LC. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation should be obtained
did not invite the court to violate its duty under that statute to obtain one. See also State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 477, 272 P.3d 417, 449 (2012), reh'g denied (Feb. 8, 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 141 (2012). ("Thus, we hold that Adamcik is not precluded by the invited

error doctrine from raising this issue on appeal, as he did not encourage the district court to offer
the specific malice instrnctions given, but merely failed to object.")
This case is more like Blake than Rollins. Counsel's failure to request additional testing
did not encourage the court's actions in any way and the purpose of the invited error doctrine
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would not be furthered by its application in this case. Consequently, the state's invited error
argument should be rejected.
The state also argues that this issue may not be addressed for the first time on appeal
because it is not fundamental error. State's Brief, pg. 6-8. This, however, is a strawman
argument because Ms. Bolan does not claim that the fundamental error doctrine applies. Rather,
she argues that the issue may be reviewed under the State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195
P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008) "manifest disregard" test. Whether that test or the "fundamental
error" set forth in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010), applies here will be
resolved by the Supreme Court in either State v. Carter, No. 39927 or State v. Clinton, No.
40461. Time will tell on this issue.

If the "manifest disregard" test survives Carter/Clinton, Ms. Bolan's case may be
reviewed under that standard. As previously argued, Dr. DeLawyer's Health and Welfare report
did not have information satisfying I. C. § 19-2522(3). To this the state notes that the evaluation
included a "detailed discussion of Bolan's troubled past, analysis of relevant mental health
concerns, and diagnoses." State's Brief, pg. 9. But that is not adequate. It did not include an
analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment as required by I. C. § 192522(3)(e). And it did not consider, as required by subsection (3)(f), the risk of danger which the
defendant may create for the public if at large. Consequently, the Health and Welfare evaluation
was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of LC. § 19-2522, because it did not address all the
statutory factors. The purpose of Dr. DeLawyer' s report was to determine what steps should be
taken so that Ms. Bolan' s three young children could be safely returned to her home. PSI, pg.
100. It was not intended to assist the court with its sentencing decision and was not an adequate
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substitute for an evaluation designed for that purpose. The trial court manifestly disregarded the
requirements of LC.§ 19-2522 by not ordering an evaluation tailored to the sentencing decision.
The state concludes its argument on this issue by noting that I.C. § 19-2522 "imposes no
requirement on the court in weighing these factors." State's Brief, pg. 10. However, that is not
the case. The statute requires the court to consider all the required parts of the report, listed in
subsection (3)(a)-(f) of the statute. That is apparent by the text of subsection (6), which states,
"Nothing in this statute is intended to limit the consideration of other evidence relevant to the
imposition of sentence." (Emphasis added.) The statute requires the court to give all the
subsection (3) factors some weight because it imposes a requirement that the report be prepared
and considered. (The state is certainly not arguing that the sentencing court could satisfy the
statute by ordering a report to be prepared while announcing it will not read the report.)
Moreover, I.C. § 19-2523(1) requires the Court to consider some of the topics required to be
covered in a § 19-2522 report: "[I]f the defendant's mental condition is a significant factor, the
court shall consider such factors as. . .. ") Here, the court could not consider all of the § 19-2523
factors because there was no § 19-2522 report. In particular, § 19-2523(2)(e) requires the court
to consider any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at large. But the
court could not do that because Dr. DeLawyer's report did not address "the risk of danger which
the defendant may create for the public if at large" as required by§ 19-2522(2)(:f). Similarly, §
l 9-2523(2)(b) requires the court to authorize treatment during the period of confinement or
probation if it concludes that "[w]ithout treatment, the immediate prognosis is for major distress
resulting in serious mental or physical deterioration of the defendant." The court could not
determine whether that was the case here because Dr. DeLawyer's report did not include an
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analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment as required by I.C. § 192522(3)(e). Thus, the state's argument in this regard is without merit.

B. The Court Erred by Failing to Consider Christina's Mental Illness
The state contends that the record shows that "the sentencing court sufficiently considered
the substance of LC.§ 19-2522(1) in making its sentencing decisions." State's Brief, pg. 12.
However, what the record really shows is that the court totally failed to take Christina's mental
health into account at sentencing. It was not mentioned by the court and there is no indication in
the record that it was considered in setting the six-year sentence.
To counter the absence of any mention of Ms. Bolan's mental health, the state asserts that
the court's "silence on the topic speaks to the implicit consensus that mental health concerns
were not significant given Bolan's substance abuse problems." State's Brief, pg. 13. But that is
just wishful thinking on the state's part. There was no implicit consensus. First, silence on a
subject does not necessarily imply a consensus. Second, while Dr. DeLawyer concluded that
Christina needed to "complete her substance abuse treatment program," he also concluded that
Christina "requires extensive mental health treatment," including consideration for psychotropic
medication and psychotherapy to treat her anxiety and depression. PSI, pg. 100. Further the PSI
writer noted that the main obstacle to a successful probation was Ms. Bolan's "criminal lifestyle"
precipitated by "a father who did not want her, a mother in prison, and being physically and
sexually abused while in foster care." PSI, pg. 13. In other words, the presentence investigator
was of the opinion that the effect of the traumas which resulted in Ms. Bolan's PTSD was the
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thing most likely to keep her from successfully completing probation. 1 There was no implicit
consensus that mental health treatment should be secondary to drug treatment. And the state's
assertion that it "was Bolan's substance abuse, not mental illness, causing her functional
impairment, affecting her ability to conform her conduct to the law, and creating a risk of danger
to others" (State's Brief, pg. 13) is not correct because the drug abuse and mental health issues
are inextricably intertwined. One cannot be addressed without addressing the other.
Finally, the state argues that State v. Quintana, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2013 WL
2382526 (Ct. App. June 3, 2013), State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,834,264 P.3d 935,941 (2011),
and State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (Ct. App. 2002), only require "that the
sentencing court's consideration of mental health factors be adequate." State's Brief, pg. 14. But
in all of those cases, the Court also required that the record show the consideration was adequate.
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476 ("The record need only show that the court
adequately considered the substance of the factors in arriving at its sentencing decision."); State
v. Quintana, 2013 WL 2382526*3 (Idaho Ct. App. June 3, 2013) ("However, the record has to
show that the court adequately considered the substance of the factors when it imposed the
sentence."), citing State v. Miller, 151 Idaho at 836,264 P.3d at 943 ("However, the record has to
show that 'the court adequately considered the substance of the factors' when it imposed the
sentence.") in turn quoting Strand, supra. And, in all those cases the record did show

The prior experiences which resulted in Ms. Bolan's supposed "criminal lifestyle" are
the incidents that Dr. DeLawyer said needed to be confronted in therapy, but which the court
advised Ms. Bolan to stop thinking about. Compare DeLawyer recommendations ("Therapy also
needs to address her history of trauma."), PSI, pg. l 00, with sentencing comments of court
("[S]ometimes people forget that when they're looking backwards at their past, they're setting
themselves up for failure.") T pg. 27, In. 1-7.
1
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consideration by the sentencing court. By contrast, the record here does not show the court gave
any consideration to Ms. Bolan's mental health problems. Thus, the sentence should be vacated.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the sentence and remand for a
new sentencing hearing.
Respectfully submitted this~ay of August, 2013.

l
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Christina Bolan
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